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Abstract
We utilize the analytical construct of a stochastic supply function to provide an aggregate
representation of a finite collection of standard deterministic supply functions. We introduce a
consistency postulate for a stochastic supply function that may be satisfied even if no underlying
deterministic supply function is rationalizable in terms of profit maximization. Our consistency
postulate is nonetheless equivalent to a stochastic expansion of supply inequality, which sum-
marizes the predictive content of the traditional theory of competitive supply. A number of key
results in the deterministic theory follow as special cases from this equivalence. In particular, it
yields a probabilistic version of the law of supply, which implies the traditional specification. Our
analysis thus provides a necessary and sufficient axiomatic foundation for a de-coupling of the
predictive content of the classical theory of competitive firm behavior from its a priori roots in
profit maximization, while subsuming the traditional theory as a special case.
KEYWORDS: supply aggregation, stochastic supply function, stochastic consistency, weak ax-
iom of profit maximization, stochastic supply inequality, law of supply
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1.  Introduction 
 
Suppose an industry contains 100 price-taking firms, which face identical input-
output price configurations.  Suppose further 50 of these firms choose the net 
output vector x  under some price vector p , while the remaining 50 choose x′  
(say, because their technology is different).  Then a natural way to model 
aggregate industry output is in terms of a stochastic supply function (SSF), which 
stipulates a choice of x  and x′ , each with probability 21 , under p .  Analogously, 
when a competitive firm faces technology shocks governed by some exogenous 
stochastic process, its supply behavior can be modeled in terms of an SSF.  Thus, 
for example, suppose the technology set available to some firm producing wheat 
is τ  if it snows at the beginning of the crop cycle, and τ ′  otherwise.  Given some 
price vector p , the firm chooses the net output vector x  if its realized (available) 
technology is τ ; it chooses x′  otherwise.  The probability of snowfall is 21 .  Then 
the supply of this firm can be modeled in terms of the SSF outlined earlier.  Both 
situations turn up routinely in applications of the theory of competitive firm 
behavior.1 
 What kind of minimal, intuitive a priori restriction would ensure that an 
SSF satisfies analogues of the empirical content of the traditional theory of 
competitive firm behavior?  The classical theory of firm behavior posits that the 
output-input choices of a competitive firm, summarized by a deterministic supply 
function (DSF), satisfy the Weak Axiom of Profit Maximization (WAPM).  
WAPM implies the familiar Supply Inequality, which in turn yields the law of 
supply.  For a firm’s choices to be rationalizable in terms of profit-maximization 
with respect to some collection of feasible input-output combinations, it is 
necessary and sufficient that its DSF satisfy WAPM.2  Thus, predictions regarding 
competitive supply behavior, whether at the firm level or at the industry level, are 
derived from WAPM.  Once firms are permitted to violate WAPM, the classical 
theory fails to generate any empirical content whatsoever.   
                                                          
1  The first situation, for example, is commonly considered in applied studies of competitive 
industry behavior and efficiency measurement, stemming from the seminal theoretical work of 
Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957).  These contexts have given rise to a large microeconometric 
literature on stochastic production frontier estimation (see, for example, Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000).  In macroeconomics, the literature on real business cycles flowing from Kydland and 
Prescott (1982) routinely models firm technology as subject to stochastic shocks. 
2  See Section 2 for formal definitions.  Samuelson (1947) introduced WAPM and the Supply 
Inequality, showed that the former implies the latter (and thereby, the law of supply), and noted 
that WAPM is necessary for profit maximization.  See also Debreu (1959, p. 47).  Hanoch and 
Rothschild (1972) showed that WAPM is sufficient for a firm’s choices to be rationalizable in 
terms of profit-maximization with reference to some technology set.  The name, WAPM, is due to 
Varian (1984). 
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Violations of WAPM appear to be frequently encountered in empirical 
studies.  It has been argued that large departures from the profit maximization 
hypothesis, and, indeed, from maximizing behavior per se, are in fact routine in 
reality.3   
In a well-known response, Becker (1962) argued that, even if individual 
firms do not maximize profits, the law of supply may hold in the aggregate as a 
market-wide phenomenon.  An extension of his claim suggests that, in contexts 
with stochastic firm technology, the law of supply may also hold in the aggregate 
as a firm-level phenomenon even if the firm does not maximize profits with 
respect to its realized technology.  Becker however based his case on examples.  
He did not provide general non-profit-maximizing behavioral foundations that 
would prove both necessary and sufficient for the empirical content of the 
traditional theory (as summarized by the Supply Inequality), to hold as an 
aggregate phenomenon.  Recently, Dasgupta (2005) has posited a consistency 
restriction for a DSF which is weaker than WAPM, yet implies the Supply 
Inequality.  However, Dasgupta left unexamined the connection between this 
restriction and aggregate supply behavior.   
Regardless of whether an SSF provides an aggregate representation of the 
supply behavior of multiple price-taking firms with deterministic (but possibly 
different) technologies, or of a single competitive firm endowed with a stochastic 
technology, what kind of minimal, intuitively plausible, a priori consistency 
restriction can one posit for SSFs, that would imply aggregate supply behavior 
broadly in consonance with the classical (deterministic) theory?  Would such a 
necessary and sufficient consistency restriction on the aggregate SSF 
representation be compatible with violation of WAPM by every underlying 
constituent DSF?  Furthermore, would this restriction be compatible even with 
violation of the condition in Dasgupta (2005) by all underlying DSFs?  If so, the 
empirical content of the classical theory (i.e. the Supply Inequality), suitably 
reinterpreted, would prove robust both: (i) as a market-wide phenomenon even 
when no individual firm exhibits choices that can be rationalized in terms of 
profit-maximization, and (ii) as a firm-level phenomenon even when the firm’s 
choices on the basis of its realized technology set invariably violates profit-
maximization.  Such an analysis would provide a general axiomatic foundation 
for a complete de-linkage between the empirical content of the classical theory of 
competitive firm behavior and the assumption of profit maximization, while 
                                                          
3  See, for example, Leibenstein (1976, 1979, 1983) and Simon (1979).  Varian (1985) provides a 
formal treatment of the notion of a ‘large’ violation in this context.  Public sector firms are often 
actively prevented from maximizing profits, in pursuance of other public objectives, even though 
they are price-takers in some competitive markets and face politically determined prices in others.  
‘Firms’ in our usage also includes foundations and other private non-profit organizations which 
are small enough to be reasonably thought of as price-takers. 
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subsuming both the analysis by Dasgupta and the traditional, WAPM-based 
theory, as special cases.  Thus, it would identify the exact sense in which “… anti-
marginalists can believe that firms are irrational, marginalists that market 
responses are rational, and both can be talking about the same economic world” 
(Becker, 1962: p.12). 
This paper offers such an analysis.  Furthermore, we show that the 
empirical content of the classical theory (i.e. a general formulation of the Supply 
Inequality) can be derived from an a priori behavioral restriction with 
independent intuitive appeal that does not presuppose even cost minimization.   
Section 2 introduces the basic notation and definitions.  In particular, we 
introduce our notion of a stochastic supply function and discuss how it can be 
used as an aggregate analytical representation of a finite class of deterministic 
supply functions.  Section 3 introduces our a priori consistency postulate for 
SSFs, which we term stochastic consistency, and discusses its properties.  We 
show that the aggregate SSF representation of a finite class of DSFs may satisfy 
stochastic consistency even if no underlying DSF can be rationalized in terms of 
profit maximization (nor satisfy cost minimization).  Our consistency postulate 
may hold even if all underlying DSFs violate the consistency restriction proposed 
by Dasgupta.  Thus, stochastic consistency completely delinks firm behavior from 
profit-maximization.  We then introduce a general probabilistic expansion of the 
classical Supply Inequality, which is equivalent to our stochastic consistency.  
Existing results in the deterministic framework, such as the relationship between 
WAPM and the Supply Inequality and the equivalence between Dasgupta’s 
condition and the Supply Inequality, turn out to be special cases of this general 
equivalence.  Our general equivalence condition also yields a probabilistic version 
of the law of supply, from which the traditional version falls out as a special case.  
Section 4 concludes. Detailed proofs are presented in the Appendix. 
 
2.  Notation and preliminaries 
 
Let n be the number of commodities and let { }nN ,...2,1= .  Let ℜ  and ++ℜ  
denote, respectively, the set of real numbers and that of positive real numbers.  A 
competitive firm faces n-dimensional vectors of commodity prices and produces 
n-tuples of net outputs.  We shall denote price vectors by pp ′,  etc. and net output 
vectors by xx ′,  etc.  The set of all possible price vectors is n++ℜ .  Given a net 
output vector x , ix  will denote the amount of the thi −  commodity contained in 
x .  Given a price vector ,p ip  will denote the price of the thi −  commodity.  We 
shall denote the power set (i.e., the set of all possible subsets) of nℜ  by ( )nℜπ .  
Given any finite set Ω , Ω  will denote the number of elements in Ω . 
3
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Definition 2.1.  A stochastic supply function (SSF) is a rule s, which 
specifies, for every np ++ℜ∈ , exactly one finitely additive probability measure t 
on ( nℜ , ( )nℜπ ) ( nℜ  being the set of outcomes and ( )nℜπ  being the relevant 
algebra in nℜ ). 
  
Given an SSF, s, let ( )pst = , and let A be a subset of nℜ .  Then ( )At  
represents the probability a net output vector will be chosen from the set A, under 
the price vector p.    
 
Definition 2.2.  A deterministic supply function (DSF) is a rule S, which 
specifies, for every np ++ℜ∈ , exactly one element of nℜ . 
 
Given a DSF, S, and given any price vector p , ( )pS  is the net output 
vector (uniquely) chosen.  A DSF can evidently be identified with a degenerate 
SSF.4  
An SSF may be used as an analytical construct to aggregate deterministic 
supply behavior by m competitive firms, represented by m (possibly different) 
DSFs, all facing the same price vector, p.  Group (industry) supply can be 
modeled via a ‘representative’ competitive firm facing p and choosing according 
to an SSF such that, for any subset A of nℜ , the probability of choosing a net 
output vector from A is simply the proportion of firms who do so.  
 
Definition 2.3.  For all { }mMj ,...,1=∈ , let jS  be a given DSF ( mSS ,...,1  
need not all be distinct).  We say that an SSF, s, aggregates mSS ,...,1  iff, for 
every np ++ℜ∈ , and every nA ℜ⊆ , [ ( ) ( ){ }m
ApSMi
At i
∈∈= | ], where  ( )pst = . 
 
An SSF may also represent supply behavior of a single competitive firm 
subject to technology shocks.  The intuitive interpretation here is that there exists 
a given m-tuple of technology sets (collections of feasible net output vectors), say 
mGG ,...,1 .  If jG  happened to be the technology set actually facing the firm, the 
firm would choose according to some DSF jS .  Given a price vector p , some 
exogenous process (‘nature’) randomly determines which technology set is 
                                                          
4  An SSF, s, is degenerate iff, for every np ++ℜ∈ , there exists nx ℜ∈  such that { }( ) 1=xt , 
where ( )pst = .  
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realized:  the firm subsequently chooses according to the corresponding DSF.  
The probability that any technology set jG  will be realized is m1 , but since 
mGG ,...,1  need not all be distinct, two distinct DSFs may have different 
probabilities of realization. 
We now summarize, for later reference, the classical theory of competitive 
firm behavior. 
  
Definition 2.4.  A DSF, S, satisfies the Weak Axiom of Profit 
Maximization (WAPM) iff, for every ordered pair of price vectors pp ′, , 
( )[ ]0≥′− xxp , where ( ) ( )pSxpSx ′=′= , . 
  
WAPM requires that, if a competitive firm happens to choose some net 
output vector x  when faced with the price vector p, then it cannot choose any net 
output vector under another price situation which would give it a higher profit 
under p.  The firm’s supply function, S, can be rationalized, i.e. interpreted, as 
being driven by the goal of profit-maximization, if one can construct a set of net 
output vectors, say Γ , such that, if the firm’s technology set was indeed Γ , and it 
wished to maximize its profit, then it would be able to do so by choosing 
according to S.5  A closed and convex set nℜ⊆Γ  exists which rationalizes S in 
terms of profit maximization if, and only if, S satisfies WAPM.6   
 
3.  Stochastic consistency and the law of supply 
 
We now introduce our consistency restriction for an SSF.  Let nx ℜ∈∗  be an 
arbitrary net output vector, and suppose the price vector changes from some initial 
situation p  to p′ .  Consider the collection of all net output vectors whose 
attractiveness relative to the reference vector ∗x  does not decline due to the price 
change.  This is the set of all net output vectors which continue to yield at least as 
much profit (or as low a loss) relative to ∗x , despite the price change.  Thus, this 
collection consists of all nx ℜ∈  which satisfy [ ( ) ( )∗∗ −≥−′ xxpxxp ].  It seems 
reasonable to require that a net output vector be chosen from this collection at 
least as frequently as earlier: the price shift has not reduced the attractiveness of 
its members.  Thus, the probability that a net output vector is chosen from this set 
                                                          
5  A DSF, S, is rationalizable in terms of profit maximization with respect to a technology set iff 
there exists some nℜ⊆Γ  such that, for all np ++ℜ∈ , (i) ( ) Γ∈pS , and (ii) ( )[ ][ ]Γ∈′′≥ vallforvpppS .  The set Γ  is said to rationalize S in terms of profit 
maximization.  
6  See Varian (1984).  
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should not decline.  An analogous condition should hold for the set of net output 
vectors which are made strictly more attractive by the price shift.7   
 
Definition 3.1.  An SSF, s, satisfies stochastic consistency iff, for every 
pair of price vectors pp ′, , and for every nx ℜ∈∗ :  
 ( ) ( ){ }( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )∗∗∗∗ −≥−′ℜ∈≥−≥−′ℜ∈′ xxpxxpxtxxpxxpxt nn || , (1) 
and 
         ( ) ( ){ }( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )∗∗∗∗ −>−′ℜ∈≥−>−′ℜ∈′ xxpxxpxtxxpxxpxt nn || . (2) 
 
where ( )pst =  and ( )pst ′=′ . 
 
Stochastic consistency is the probabilistic analogue of a restriction on an 
individual firm’s deterministic supply behavior, introduced by Dasgupta (2005), 
which we term ‘consistency’ here.  Suppose the firm chooses, respectively, the net 
output vectors xx ′~,~ , under pp ′, .  Suppose further that, by choosing x~  instead of 
the feasible alternative x ′~  under p , the firm loses some amount, say $10.  
Consistency requires that the loss entailed by the choice of x~  instead of x ′~  under 
p′  must be at least $10 (since otherwise, intuitively, a consistent firm should 
have persisted with x~  under p′ , instead of switching to x ′~ ). 
 
Definition 3.2.  A DSF, S, satisfies consistency iff, for every pair of price 
vectors pp ′, : 
 ( ) ( )xxpxxp ~~~~ −′≥−′′ ;                                                                              (3) 
 
where ( ) ( )pSxpSx =′=′ ~,~ . 
 
Since (3) is equivalent to ( )( ) 0~~ ≥−′−′ xxpp , consistency is equivalent to 
the familiar Supply Inequality, which simply imposes this latter restriction. 
 
Observation 3.3.  A degenerate SSF, s, satisfies stochastic consistency iff 
the DSF corresponding to s satisfies consistency. 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 
                                                          
7  Intuitively, our condition thus treats profit as a consideration in choice, but not necessarily the 
only consideration. 
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Dasgupta has shown that, for a DSF, consistency is weaker than WAPM 
(recall Definitions 3.2 and 2.4 and note Example 3.7 below).  By Observation 3.3, 
the following relationship thus holds between WAPM and stochastic consistency 
for a degenerate SSF. 
 
Observation 3.4.   
(i)  A degenerate SSF, s, may satisfy stochastic consistency even if the DSF 
corresponding to s violates WAPM. 
(ii)  If a DSF, S, satisfies WAPM, then the degenerate SSF corresponding to S 
must satisfy stochastic consistency.   
 
When an SSF aggregates a finite class of DSFs (recall Definition 2.3), 
stochastic consistency turns out to be a weaker restriction than the condition that 
the constituent DSFs all individually satisfy consistency.   
 
Lemma 3.5.  Let { }mM ,...,1=  be a given finite set, 1≥M .   
(i) For every m-tuple of DSFs mSS ,..,1  such that [for all Mj ∈ , jS  
satisfies consistency], the SSF aggregating mSS ,..,1  satisfies stochastic 
consistency.  
(ii) For all 2≥m , there exists an m-tuple of DSFs mSS ,..,1  such that: [for 
every Mj ∈ , jS  violates consistency], but the SSF aggregating mSS ,..,1  
satisfies stochastic consistency. 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 
Recall now that, for a DSF, WAPM necessarily implies consistency; but a 
DSF may satisfy consistency, yet violate WAPM (see Example 3.7 below).  In 
light of this, Lemma 3.5 immediately yields the following. 
 
Proposition 3.6.  Let { }mM ,...,1=  be a given finite set, 1≥M .   
(i) For every m-tuple of DSFs mSS ,..,1  such that [for all Mj ∈ , jS  
satisfies WAPM], the SSF aggregating mSS ,..,1  satisfies stochastic consistency.  
(ii) There exists an m-tuple of DSFs, mSS ,..,1 , such that: [for every Mj ∈ , 
jS  violates WAPM], but the SSF aggregating mSS ,..,1  satisfies stochastic 
consistency. 
 
Proposition 3.6 summarizes our central finding.  Proposition 3.6(ii) brings 
into focus the disconnect between profit maximization and stochastic consistency: 
7
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the aggregate SSF representation may satisfy stochastic consistency even if not a 
single underlying DSF can be rationalized via profit-maximization.  Thus, given 
any finite collection of DSFs, stochastic consistency for their aggregate SSF 
representation is weaker than the requirement that all constituent DSFs be 
rationalizable in terms of profit maximization.  
 Our framework takes, as its theoretical prior, a given finite collection of 
DSFs, and derives an SSF as its aggregate representation.  This seems the natural 
modeling approach in the case of aggregation over a collection of competitive 
firms.  In the case of an SSF that models supply behavior of an individual firm 
subject to stochastic technology shocks, in some empirical contexts, the 
underlying collection of alternative DSFs over which ‘nature’ randomizes may 
not be directly observable.  Proposition 3.6(ii) implies that one can have a given 
prior collection of DSFs, all of whom violate WAPM, yet whose aggregate SSF 
representation satisfies stochastic consistency.  But, given an SSF, s, satisfying 
stochastic consistency, does there necessarily exist some m-tuple of DSFs, at least 
one of whom satisfies WAPM, and whose aggregate representation is s ? 
The following example shows that even this is not the case.  An SSF,s , may 
satisfy stochastic consistency, yet every possible finite collection of DSFs that 
yields s as its aggregate representation may exhibit violation of WAPM by all its 
constituents.  Thus, an SSF may satisfy stochastic consistency even when it is 
completely impervious to ex post rationalization in terms of profit-maximization. 
 
Example 3.7.  Let s be an SSF specified as follows: for all np ++ℜ∈ , 
[ ( ){ }( ) ( ){ }( )
2
10,...,0,2,10,...,0,1,1 =−=− tt  if 12 ≥p ; and 
( ){ }( ) ( ){ }( )
2
10,...,0,4,10,...,0,3,1 =−=− tt  if 12 <p ], where ( )pst = .  The SSF s 
satisfies stochastic consistency.  Nonetheless, any m-tuple of DSFs that s can be 
said to aggregate must exhibit violation of WAPM (and satisfaction of 
consistency) by all its constituents.                                                                                                                
 
Remark 3.8.  The example above also shows that an SSF may satisfy 
stochastic consistency, yet its constituent DSFs may all violate cost-minimization.  
Furthermore, an SSF may satisfy stochastic consistency even when it is 
inconsistent with any collection of DSFs satisfying cost-minimization. 
 
An SSF, s, satisfies stochastic consistency whenever there exists at least one 
m-tuple of DSFs that s can be said to aggregate, all of whose members 
individually satisfy consistency (Lemma 3.5(i)).  Intuitively, economizing on 
input use when input prices are high, but not when they are low, does not appear 
8
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intrinsically contradictory, even though this entails losses in the latter situation.  
X-efficiency analyses of firm behavior, for example, often highlight cases where 
firms improve their technical efficiency in response to a rise in input costs.  
Evidently, every member of any m-tuple of DSFs that the SSF in Example 3.7 can 
be said to aggregate must exhibit this feature.  Consistency permits such internally 
coherent loss-making behavior, WAPM rules it out.  In essence, it is this 
difference between the two conditions that Example 3.7 exploits.8     
We now specify a probabilistic analogue of the deterministic Supply 
Inequality, which summarizes the main empirical content of the classical theory 
of competitive firm behavior. 
 
Definition 3.9.  An SSF, s, satisfies stochastic supply inequality iff, for 
every pair of price vectors pp ′, , and for every ℜ∈z :  
 ( ){ }( ) ( ){ }( )zxppxtzxppxt nn ≥−′ℜ∈≥≥−′ℜ∈′ || ,                            (4) 
and  ( ){ }( ) ( ){ }( )zxppxtzxppxt nn >−′ℜ∈≥>−′ℜ∈′ || ;                            (5) 
 
where ( )pst =  and ( )pst ′=′ . 
 
Let z  be any arbitrary real number, and suppose the price vector changes 
from some initial situation p  to p′ .  Consider the collection of all net output 
vectors whose profitability increases by at least z  due to the price change.  
Stochastic supply inequality requires that the probability of choosing from this 
collection should not fall under p′ .  An analogous requirement should also hold 
with regard to the collection of all net output vectors whose profitability increases 
by more than z .   
It can be checked that stochastic supply inequality is equivalent to 
stochastic consistency.  This general equivalence evidently subsumes the 
equivalence of consistency and supply inequality for the deterministic 
                                                          
8  Satisfaction of stochastic consistency by an SSF, s, is necessary to ensure the existence of some 
finite collection of DSFs that yields s as its aggregate representation, while exhibiting satisfaction 
of consistency by all its constituents (recall Lemma 3.5(i)).  But is it also sufficient?  This 
important question appears open at this stage.  Given any pair of price vectors pp ′, , and an 
SSF, s, satisfying stochastic consistency, there must exist an m-tuple of DSFs, whose aggregate 
representation is s, and whose members all individually satisfy (3) for pp ′, .  But does there 
necessarily exist at least one such m-tuple, whose members all individually satisfy (3) for every 
other possible pair of price vectors as well?  We have been unable to resolve this issue so far. 
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(degenerate) special case.  Furthermore, in light of this general equivalence, 
stochastic consistency yields a probabilistic expansion of the law of supply, which 
subsumes the traditional, deterministic, version.   
Suppose the price of a commodity rises, all other prices remaining 
invariant.  Our (stochastic dominance) formulation of the law of supply requires 
that, for every real number β , neither the probability of producing at least β  
amount of the commodity, nor the probability of producing more than β  amount 
of the commodity, should decrease.   
 
Notation 3.10.  For every Ni∈ , let iK  denote the set of all ordered pairs 
of price vectors pp ′,  such that (i) jj pp ′=[  for all {}]iNj \∈  and (ii) ii pp >′ . 
 
Definition 3.11.  An SSF, s, satisfies the law of supply iff, for all R∈β , 
for all Ni∈ , and for all ordered pairs iKpp ∈′, , we have: 
 { }( ) { }( )ββ ≥ℜ∈≥≥ℜ∈′ inin xxtxxt || ,                                                 (6)                                     
and  { }( ) { }( )ββ >ℜ∈≥>ℜ∈′ inin xxtxxt || ;                                                (7)   
                                               
where ( )pst =  and ( )pst ′=′ . 
 
Proposition 3.12.  If an SSF satisfies stochastic consistency, then it must 
satisfy the law of supply. 
 Proof:  See the Appendix. 
    
The law of supply in its standard, deterministic, version follows from 
Proposition 3.12.   
 
Corollary 3.13.  If a DSF, S, satisfies consistency, then, for all Ni∈ , and 
for all ordered pairs iKpp ∈′, , [ ii xx ≥′ ], where ( ) ( )pSxpSx ′=′= , . 
 
4.  Concluding remarks 
 
This paper extends and completes a line of investigation initiated by Becker 
(1962) and continued by Dasgupta (2005), which argued that the primary 
empirical/predictive content of the traditional theory of competitive firm behavior 
can be delinked from its behavioral presumption of profit-maximization.  Our 
analysis provides a necessary and sufficient axiomatic foundation for such de-
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linkage, while subsuming both the contribution of Dasgupta and the traditional, 
WAPM-based theory as special cases.9   
We have utilized the analytical construct of a stochastic supply function to 
provide an aggregate representation of a finite class of standard deterministic 
supply functions.  We have introduced an intuitively plausible consistency 
postulate for a stochastic supply function that may be satisfied even if no 
underlying deterministic supply function is open to rationalization in terms of 
profit maximization (nor, indeed, satisfies cost-minimization).  In this sense, our 
consistency postulate provides a complete conceptual departure from the 
traditional presumption of profit-maximization.  Despite this departure, our 
consistency postulate turns out to be equivalent to a stochastic analogue of the 
deterministic condition of supply inequality, which summarizes the predictive 
content of the traditional theory of competitive firm behavior.  This finding 
provides the central equivalence in the theory of competitive firm behavior, in that 
a number of results in the deterministic theory follow as special cases.  In 
particular, it yields a probabilistic version of the law of supply, which implies the 
traditional specification.  It is difficult to see how a theory of supply with any 
applicability can afford to dispense with the law of supply, at least in its 
probabilistic version.  In this sense, our analysis also appears to set the conceptual 
limits beyond which the behavioral presumptions of the traditional theory cannot 
be substantively relaxed without seriously undermining its predictive import. 
  If not profit, exactly what is the objective function (if any) that a 
competitive firm need maximize to satisfy our consistency condition?  In other 
words, can one characterize some objective function, maximization of which over 
probabilistic convex technology sets would provide a necessary and sufficient 
rationalization of firm choice behavior that satisfies our stochastic consistency?  
Would such an objective function be open to intuitive interpretation?   These 
questions, which relate to a preference-based counterpart of the choice-based 
theory of competitive supply developed in this paper, suggest themselves as 
useful candidates for future investigations.   
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of Observation 3.3.   
First consider a degenerate SSF, s, satisfying stochastic consistency.  Since s is 
degenerate, there must exist some nxx ℜ∈′ ~,~  such that { }( ) { }( )xtxt ′′== ~1~ .  Since, 
given stochastic consistency, (1) holds for all nx ℜ∈∗ , it must also hold for 
xx ~≡∗ .  Thus, (1) implies: [ ( ) ( ){ }( ) 1~~| =−≥−′ℜ∈′ xxpxxpxt n ]; i.e., (3).   
                                                          
9  In so doing, we also provide a supply theoretic parallel to the revealed preference treatment of 
stochastic demand behavior recently developed by Bandyopadhyay et al. (2004, 2002, 1999).  
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Now consider a DSF, S, satisfying consistency.   Given any nx ℜ∈∗ , (3) 
is equivalent to: 
 ( )( ) ( )( )∗∗ −−′≥−′−′ xxppxxpp ~~ .                                                           (8) 
 
The degenerate SSF corresponding to S must therefore satisfy, for all nx ℜ∈∗ , 
 ( )( ){ }( ) ( )( ){ }( )0|0| ≥−−′ℜ∈≥≥−−′ℜ∈′ ∗∗ xxppxtxxppxt nn ;         (9) 
 ( )( ){ }( ) ( )( ){ }( )0|0| >−−′ℜ∈≥>−−′ℜ∈′ ∗∗ xxppxtxxppxt nn .       (10) 
 
Respectively, (9) and (10) imply (1) and (2).                                                         ◊  
 
Proof of Lemma 3.5.   
(i)   Suppose, for all Mj ∈ , jS  satisfies consistency.  Consider any 
npp ℜ∈′,  and any nx ℜ∈∗ .  Let ( ) jj xpS ~=  , ( ) ′=′ jj xpS ~ .  Then, from (3), we 
get: 
 
for all Mj ∈ , [ ( ) ( )( )∗∗ −−′≥⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −′−′ xxppxxpp jj ~~ ].                        (11) 
 
Notice now that the aggregate SSF representation, s, of mSS ,...,1  must satisfy: 
 
 ( )( ){ }( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }
m
xpSppMj
xxppxt jn
0|
0|
≥−−′∈=≥−−′ℜ∈
∗
∗ ; 
( )( ){ }( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }
m
xpSppMj
xxppxt jn
0|
0|
≥−′−′∈=≥−−′ℜ∈′
∗
∗ . 
 
By (11),  
 ( ) ( )( ){ } ( ) ( )( ){ }0|0| ≥−′−′∈⊆≥−−′∈ ∗∗ xpSppMjxpSppMj jj .   
 
Condition (1) follows.  An analogous argument establishes (2).   
(ii) Let ip  be the price of commodity Ni∈ , and let the net output vector 
supplied according to the DSF jS  be denoted by 
jx , Mj∈ .  Let 
( )0,...,0,1,11 −=x  if either 21 p>  or mp ≥2 ; ( )0,...,0,3,11 −=x  otherwise.  For all 
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{ }mj ,...,2∈ , let ( )0,...,0,1,1 −=jx  if  12 −≥> jpj ; ( )0,...,0,3,1 −=jx  otherwise.  
Then, for every Mj∈ , jS  violates consistency.   Consider the SSF aggregation, 
s, of mSS ,...,1 : regardless of the price vector, the net output vectors ( )0,...,0,1,1 −  
and ( )0,...,0,3,1 −  must be chosen with probability 
m
1  and 
m
m 1− , respectively.  
Clearly, s satisfies stochastic consistency.                                                              ◊  
 
Proof of Proposition 3.12. 
Noting (4), if an SSF satisfies stochastic supply inequality, for all Ni∈ , for all 
iKpp ∈′, , and for every ℜ∈z :  
 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −′
≥ℜ∈≥
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −′
≥ℜ∈′
ii
i
n
ii
i
n
pp
zxxt
pp
zxxt || .           (12)    
                   
Hence, given any ℜ∈β , (12) holds for ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −
′= ii ppz β : (6) follows.  Noting 
(5), an analogous argument establishes (7).  Proposition 3.12 follows from the 
equivalence between stochastic supply inequality and stochastic consistency.     ◊  
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